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The Johnson Administration initially limited its response to a terse diplomatic note to Hanoi, the first-ever U.S. diplomatic note to that government. Until the ICC investigation blew over a week later, the commandos camped on a small pier. Ticonderoga ordered four A-1H Skyraiders into the air to support the ships. Office of the Historian Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident - ThoughtCo I would not suggest that he learned from the Gulf of Tonkin incident so much as that he got from it exactly what he wanted, which was an enormous bump in approval ratings 30 percent overnight, says historian Chris Oppe. Speculation about administration motives surrounding the Tonkin Gulf incident itself and the subsequent withholding of key information will probably never cease, but the factual intelligence record that drove those decisions is now clear. And so, in the course of a single day, and operating on imperfect information,Johnson changedthe trajectory of the Vietnam War. Typically, the missions were carried out by a destroyer specially outfitted with sensitive eavesdropping equipment. Interview, authors with James Hawes, 31 March 1996. Carl Schuster is a retired U.S. Navy intelligence officer with 10 years of experience as a surface line officer. . This article is based on the PRI podcast, LBJ's War, hosted by David Brown. This mission coincided with several 34A attacks, including an Aug. 1 raid on Hon Me and Hon Ngu Islands. The most comprehensive and authoritative history site on the Internet. Tonkin Gulf Resolution (1964) | National Archives In turn, that means a minimum of several hundred persons were party to a plot that has remained watertight in sieve-like Washington for two decades. This time, however, President Johnson reacted much more skeptically and ultimately decided to take no retaliatory action. He spoke out against banning girls education. The commander also added the requirement of collecting photographic intelligence of ships and aircraft encountered, as well as weather and hydrographic information. Even in the darkness, the commandos could see their targeta water tower surrounded by a few military buildings. WebJoe Rogan interview on the 911 Conspiracy Theory. 302-303. Along with other American warships, Maddox was steaming in international waters some 28 nautical miles off North Vietnams coast, gathering information on that countrys coastal radars. But only a few minutes later, McNamara was back on the line with news of a second incident in the Gulf of Tonkin. Signals Intelligence is a valuable source but it is not perfect. 14. He is the author of Shadow War: The Secret War in Laos, as well as several short studies on special operations, including The War in Cambodia (Osprey Books, 1988), The War in Laos (Osprey Books, 1989), and Southeast Asian Special Forces (Osprey Books, 1990). The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident | Naval History Despite this tremendous uncertainty, by midafternoon, the discussion among Johnson and his advisers was no longer about whether to respondbut how. 8. To the northwest, though they could not see it in the blackness, was Hon Me; to the southwest lay Hon Nieu. Background intelligence on North Vietnam, its radar networks and command-and-control systems was limited. But for a band of South Vietnamese commandos and a handful of U.S. advisers, not much had changed. Mr. Andrad is a Vietnam War historian with the U.S. Army Center of Military History, where he is writing a book on combat operations from 1969 through 1973. Senate investigations in 1968 and 1975 did little to clarify the events or the evidence, lending further credence to the various conspiracy theories. Joseph C. Goulden, Truth Is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin AffairIllusion and Reality (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1969), p. 80. AIDS Brotherhood Symbology The Illuminati Flame . In the first few days of August 1964, a series of events off the coast of North Vietnam and decisions made in Washington, D.C., set the United States on a course that would largely define the next decade and weigh heavily on American foreign policy to this day. 5. Hanoi pointed out what Washington denied: "On July 30, 1964 . The only opposition came from a few scattered machine guns on shore, but they did no damage. Suddenly, North Vietnamese guns opened fire from the shore. They issued a recall order from Haiphong to the port commander and communications relay boat two hours after the torpedo boat squadron command issued its attack order. Midday on August 1, NSGA San Miguel, the U.S. Marine Corps SIGINT detachment co-located with the U.S. Army at Phu Bai, and Maddoxs own DSU all detected the communications directing the North Vietnamese torpedo boats to depart from Haiphong on August 2. Surprised by the North Vietnamese response, Johnson decided that the United States could not back away from the challenge and directed his commanders in the Pacific to continue with the Desoto missions. In the future, conventional operations would receive all the attention. 426-436. The boats followed at their maximum speed of 44 knots, continuing the chase for more than 20 minutes. Carl Otis Schuster, U.S. Navy (ret.) 4. Reinforced by Turner Joy, Herrick returned to the area on Aug. 4. This time the U.S. ships detected electronic signals and acoustic indications of a likely second North Vietnamese naval attack, and they requested U.S. air support. Not all wars are made for navies, and the U.S. Navy had to insinuate itself into the Vietnam one and carve out a role. Covert maritime operations were in full swing, and some of the missions succeeded in blowing up small installations along the coast, leading General Westmoreland to conclude that any close connection between 34A and Desoto would destroy the thin veneer of deniability surrounding the operations. Within days, Hanoi lodged a complaint with the International Control Commission (ICC), which had been established in 1954 to oversee the provisions of the Geneva Accords. People are human and make mistakes, particularly in the pressure of a crisis or physical threat to those they support. In addition, the US Navy was instructed to conduct Desoto patrols off North Vietnam. Everything went smoothly until the early hours of 2 August, when intelligence picked up indications that the North Vietnamese Navy had moved additional Swatows into the vicinity of Hon Me and Hon Nieu Islands and ordered them to prepare for battle. The first Desoto Mission was conducted by USS Craig (DD-885) in March 1964. Our response, for the present, will be limited and fitting. Four boats, PTF-1, PTF-2 (the American-made patrol boats), PTF-5, and PTF-6 (Nasty boats), were on their way to bombard a North Vietnamese radar installation at Vinh Son and a security post on the banks of the nearby Ron River, both about 90 miles north of the DMZ. This is another government conspiracy that's true. The Gulf of Tonkin incident led to the expansion of the Vietnam War that resulted in a lot of American soldier casualties. It can be deceived and it is all too often incomplete. Taking evasive action, they fired on numerous radar targets. During a meeting at the White House on the evening of 4 August, President Johnson asked McCone, "Do they want a war by attacking our ships in the middle of the Gulf of Tonkin? The errors made in the initial analysis were due to a combination of inexperience, limited knowledge of North Vietnams operations and an operational imperative to ensure that the U.S. Navy ships would not be caught by surprise. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 3 August 1964. The three torpedo boats continued through the American barrage and launched their torpedoes at 1516. A lesser-known fact is that Jim Morrisons father, Captain George Stephen Morrison, commanded the Carrier Division during the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. He also requested air support. Maddox detected the torpedo boats on radar at a range of almost 20,000 yards and turned away at its top speed of 32 knots. In the years covered here, the Navy was generally known throughout the U.S. Mission in Saigon for being in the housekeeping business, operating supply warehouses, and running the officer clubs, PXs and other amenities, an inevitable part of the American military's baggage. Ten shocking conspiracy theories that were completely Meanwhile, by late August 3, the North Vietnamese had learned the condition of their torpedo boats and ordered a salvage tug to recover the damaged craft. Gulf of Tonkin - Wikipedia The departure of the North Vietnamese salvage tug en route to the damaged craft was reported to the American ships as a submarine chaser, not a serious threat but certainly more so than an unarmed seagoing tug. Hereafter referred to as FRUS, Vietnam 1964; Congressional Research Service, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part II, 1961-1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 287; Message CTG72.1 040140Z August 1964 (Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 425). The two boats headed northeast along the same route they had come, then turned south for the run back to South Vietnam. When the contacts appeared to turn away at 6,000 yards, Maddoxs crew interpreted the move as a maneuver to mark a torpedo launch. President Johnson and his advisers nevetheless went forward with a public announcement of an attack. We have ample forces to respond not only to these attacks on these destroyers but also to retaliate, should you wish to do so, against targets on the land, he toldthe president. Although Washington officials did not believe Hanoi would attack the Desoto ships again, tensions ran high on both sides, and this affected their respective analyses of the events to come. McNamara and the JCS believed that this intercept decisively provided the smoking gun of the second attack, and so the president reported to the American people and Congress. U.S. SIGINT support had provided ample warning of North Vietnams intentions and actions, enabling the American ship to defend itself successfully. But Morse did not know enough about the program to ask pointed questions. It also outlined the Maddoxs path along the coast on 2 August and the 34A attacks on Vinh Son the following day. The Gulf of Tonkin incident was a brief confrontation between United States and North Vietnamese warships, off the coast of northern Vietnam in August 1964. LBJ was looking for a pretext to go to Congress to ask for a resolution that would give him the authority to do basically whatever the hell he wanted to do in Vietnam, without the intense public debate that a declaration of war would have required, says historian Chris Oppe. Unlike McNamara, Johnson, on the morning of Aug.4,1964, was in less of a hurry to respond to an attack. When you visit the site, Dotdash Meredith and its partners may store or retrieve information on your browser, mostly in the form of cookies. The disclaimer is required, if for no other reason than because of Chapter 15, "The American Response to the Gulf of Tonkin Attacks," about which more later. A North Vietnamese patrol boat also trailed the American ships, reporting on their movements to Haiphong. This along with flawed signals intelligence from the National Security Agency led Johnson to order retaliatory airstrikes against North Vietnam. Neither ships crew knew about the North Vietnamese salvage operation. Shortly after taking office following the death of President John F. Kennedy, President Lyndon B. Johnson became concerned about South Vietnam's ability to fend off the Communist Viet Cong guerillas that were operating in the country. The North Vietnamese coastal radars also tracked and reported the positions of U.S. aircraft operating east of the ships, probably the combat air patrol the Seventh Fleet had ordered in support. A brief account of the raids is in MACVSOG 1964 Command History, Annex A, 14 January 1965, pp. The "nada notion" -- that nothing happened and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident was the product of inexperienced sonarmen and the overworked imagination of young deck-watch officers -- can no longer be sustained. PTF-6 took up station at the mouth of the Ron River, lit up the sky with illumination rounds, and fired at the security post. With that report, after nearly four decades, the NSA officially reversed its verdict on the events of August 4, 1964, that had led that night to President Lyndon Johnsons televised message to the nation: The initial attack on the destroyer Maddox, on August 2, was repeated today by a number of hostile vessels attacking two U.S. destroyers with torpedoes. For the maritime war specialist, it is of course invaluable. They were nicknamed "gassers" because they burned gasoline rather than diesel fuel. Westmoreland reported that although he was not absolutely certain why the Swatows were shifted south, the move "could be attributable to recent successful [34A] operations. For additional reading, see the recently declassified NSA study by Robert J. Hanyok, Spartans in the Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975; and Tonkin Gulf and The Escalation of the Vietnam War, by Edward Moise. At 1505, when the torpedo boats had closed within 10,000 yards, in accordance with Captain Herricks orders and as allowed under international law at that time, Maddox fired three warning shots. It still is not clear whether the order was intended to halt the attack or to delay it until after nightfall, when there was a much greater chance for success. A subsequent review of the SIGINT reports revealed that this later interceptMcNamaras smoking gunwas in fact a follow-on, more in-depth report of the August 2 action. WebNational Security Agency/Central Security Service > Home The Tonkin Gulf Incident in the past two decades has been treated by at least three full-scale studies, dealt with at length by Congressional committees and extensively referenced in general histories, presidential memoirs and textbooks on the U.S. legislative function. Those early mistakes led U.S. destroyers to open fire on spurious radar contacts, misinterpret their own propeller noises as incoming torpedoes, and ultimately report an attack that never occurred. Thats what all the country wants, because Goldwater's raising so much hell about how he's gonna blow 'em off the moon, and they say that we oughtn't to do anything that the national interest doesn't require. Both orders were repeated, but only the latter was relayed to the torpedo boats before the attack was launched. The truth about 'False Flags' from Nazi Germany to the Vietnam War Seeking to follow the established policy of containment, Johnson and his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, began increasing military aid to South Vietnam. Media reporting on the NSA reports assessments sparked a brief rehash of the old arguments about the Gulf of Tonkin. the Gulf of Tonkin The NSA report is revealing. By 1400 hours EDT, the president had approved retaliatory strikes against North Vietnamese naval bases for the next morning, August 5, at 0600 local time, which was 1900 EDT on August 4 in Washington. Although McNamara did not know it at the time, part of his statement was not true; Captain Herrick, the Desoto patrol commander, did know about the 34A raids, something that his ships logs later made clear. The SIGINT intercepts also detected that the North Vietnamese coastal radar stations were tracking Maddox and reporting its movements to the outbound torpedo boats. . Like all intelligence, it must be analyzed and reported in context. North Vietnams immediate concern was to determine the exact position and status of its torpedo boats and other forces. No actual visual sightings by Maddox.". The North Vietnamese didnt buy the distinction; they attacked the USS Maddox. On 7 August, the Senate passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, allowing the administration greater latitude in expanding the war by a vote of 88 to 2. And who is going to believe that? WebMany historians now agree that the Gulf of Tonkin incident, in which many believed North Vietnamese ships had attacked American naval forces, may not have occurred in the way it was described at the time. In any event, the attack took place in broad daylight under conditions of clear visibility. By late July 1964, SOG had four Nasty-class patrol boats, designated. Send the First Troops to Vietnam? 4. At this point, U.S. involvement in Vietnam remained largely in the background. The Taliban silenced him. https://www.historynet.com/case-closed-the-gulf-of-tonkin-incident/, Jerrie Mock: Record-Breaking American Female Pilot, When 21 Sikh Soldiers Fought the Odds Against 10,000 Pashtun Warriors, Few Red Tails Remain: Tuskegee Airman Dies at 96. WebGulf of Tonkin Resolution, also called Tonkin Gulf Resolution, resolution put before the U.S. Congress by Pres. The North also protested the South Vietnamese commando raid on Hon Me Island and claimed that the Desoto Mission ships had been involved in that raid. Neither the United States nor State of Vietnam signed anything at the 1954 Geneva Conference. On 30 July, Westmoreland revised the 34A maritime operations schedule for August, increasing the number of raids by "283% over the July program and 566% over June. "13 As far as the State Department was concerned, there was no need to "review" the operations. In 1964 an Ohio woman took up the challenge that had led to Amelia Earharts disappearance. 2. You can find out more about our use, change your default settings, and withdraw your consent at any time with effect for the future by visiting Cookies Settings, which can also be found in the footer of the site. There was no way to get a commando team ashore to plant demolition charges; they would have do what damage they could with the boats guns.3 Summary Notes of the 538th Meeting of the NSC, 4 August 1964, 6:15-6:40 p.m.. 13. These secret intelligence-gathering missions and sabotage operations had begun under the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1961, but in January 1964, the program was transferred to the Defense Department under the control of a cover organization called the Studies and Observations Group (SOG). THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND THE VIETNAM CONFLICT Volume II: From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959-1965 By Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald Government Printing Office for The Naval Historical Center 591 pp. Badly damaged, the boat limped home. The contacts were to the northeast of the ship, putting them about 100 nautical miles from North Vietnam but very close to Chinas Hainan Island. A Senate investigation revealed that the Maddox had been on an intelligence Subsequent SIGINT reporting and faulty analysis that day further reinforced earlier false impressions. In response, the North Vietnamese boat launched a torpedo. The rounds set some of the buildings ablaze, keeping the defenders off balance. Herrick requested aerial reconnaissance for the next morning to search for the wreckage of the torpedo boats he thought he had sunk. By then, early news accounts had already solidified some opinions, and the Johnson Administration had decided to launch retaliatory strikes. The report also identifies what SIGINT couldand could nottell commanders about their enemies and their unreliable friends in the war. The captain of Maddox, Commander Herbert L. Ogier Jr., ordered his ship to battle stations shortly after 1500 hours. Although the total intelligence picture of North Vietnams actions and communications indicates that the North Vietnamese did in fact order the first attack, it remains unclear whether Maddox was the originally intended target. During May, Admiral U. S. G. Sharp, the Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief, had suggested that 34A raids could be coordinated "with the operation of a shipboard radar to reduce the possibility of North Vietnamese radar detection of the delivery vehicle." "11 The secondary mission of the Gulf of Tonkin patrols was to assert American freedom of navigation in international waters. Nigerians await election results in competitive race. The U.S. in-theater SIGINT assets were limited, as was the number of Vietnamese linguists. These warning shots were fired and the P-4s launched a torpedo attack. Returning fire, Maddox scored hits on the P-4s while being struck by a single 14.5-millimeter machine gun bullet. They never intended to attack U.S. forces, and were not even within 100 nautical miles of the U.S. destroyers position at the time of the purported second engagement..